Fatal Gulfstream Accident into Aspen Colorado

In March of 2001 A Gulfstream III crashed into the terrain just short of the runway at Aspen Colorado.  The people on board were victims of a tragic and avoidable accident.

In aviation there are pressures that are put on the pilot(s) of aircraft.  Common pressures come from the passengers, a desire to do the popular thing, weather, pressure from a boss, family etc.  It is not unlikely that a combination of these pressures will occur at the same time.  It is when a pilot has a chain of poor decisions that these pressures can turn fatal.

If a frog is dropped into a pot of boiling water he will immediately jump out.  However, if a frog is put into a pot of cool water, and then the water is heated up slowly, the frog will boil to death.  Even so, a pilot, if immediately put into a situation that he/she is not comfortable with, he/she will immediately escape.  However, in the case of the Gulfstream crew, if those pressures are applied one at a time, the crew will not realize the boiling water that they are in danger of, and will not jump.

The crew had multiple warning flags as the departure time was pushed back.  A situation where the "boss" tells the dispatcher to "keep his/her mouth shut" and disregards the safety of the aircraft is key.  In all reality the "boss" probably doesn't know the risks involved, and most likely is not a pilot.  As PIC, the captain should have recognized that first chain in the accident chain.  After that first incident, the captain could have realized the lack of time, and the dangerous situation that he was getting himself into.  He had flown into Aspen 3 times before with his first officer, and he had to have been familiar with the terrain surrounding the airport.

If I were in that situation, I probably would have started the flight, with the condition that if the situation looked bad, I would immediately go missed and proceed to the alternate airport.  From the weather reports, the Gulfstream was attempting to land at the precise moment when the weather was the worst.  Lodging and staying in an alternate area for the night is a small price to pay in exchange for life.  Flights into marginal weather should be treated with extreme caution, and at the first indication of danger flight to the alternate should be seriously considered.

This is the link to the article posted by AOPA.

http://www.aopa.org/asf/asfarticles/2005/sp0504.html

Single Pilot IFR

Single Pilot IFR.

Oh boy.  As a pilot, flying an airplane under IFR (instrument flight rules) includes a lot more work than normal VFR (visual flight rules) flight.  This is because the pilot is required to fly the airplane at a specific, monitored altitude, and to arrive at specific times at each location.  Commercial airliners always fly under IFR, but most are required to have more than one pilot.

The safety advisory published by AOPA addresses this situation in general aviation.  SPIFR is something that can be accomplished by a proficient, confident, and prepared pilot.  This article does a good job of addressing the factors that will cause most pilots to struggle in SPIFR, as well as procedures to overcome these issues.  One thing specific was keeping ahead of the aircraft.  The article stated that if a pilot cannot anticipate the necessary action with the aircraft at least 2 minutes in advance, that pilot could not fly SPIFR safely.  Sometimes it is necessary for a pilot to anticipate IFR procedures up to an hour before arriving at that part of the approach.

Personally I have not ever flown in IFR conditions, but I believe I would feel comfortable doing it if I had an opportunity to prepare and practice flying in "actual" IMC conditions with another experienced pilot and/or an instructor.  I enjoy flying IFR flight plans, and have kept myself proficient in flying multiple types of instrument approaches consistently.  While I understand that overconfidence is a definite hazard, I believe that I would be able to handle the necessary workload of SPIFR.

Blog Post #2

AOPA published a safety briefing on Electrical fires in flight.  I felt that the information was very interesting, and I realized things that I hadn't know before.  One of the things that really jumped out to me was how important it is to shut everything off and then follow that up with turning things back on one at a time.  

The article addressed simple electric theory, explaining what a short circuit is.  A short circuit is when the electricity is able to jump to an unanticipated route, usually a pair of bare wires or a ground contact that wasn't   what the manufacturer built.  This can create a definite hazard, and has the potential of starting an electrical fire.

In the Seminole, (the light twin I will be doing my training in) the emergency procedures are very similar to those advised by AOPA.  As with all other emergencies, the most important reaction is to stay calm and FLY the airplane.  After doing everything possible to eliminate the source of the fire, the next thing to do is to get down as soon as possible.  

While I hope to never have to deal with an electrical (or engine) fire in-flight, I will do my best to simulate and practice emergency procedures.  Keeping calm, and realizing that the aircraft has the potential for certain emergencies will help me to react quickly and efficiently.  I will react as quickly as possible, enabling me to keep the aircraft and its passengers safe.